The correct policy would have been to spread the revolution throughout the world on the basis of Trotsky’s theory of Permanent Revolution, as advanced by the Left Opposition.
The failures of the revolutions in Germany through 1923 were terrible tragedies, prepared largely by the betrayals of the Second International and the inexperiance of the new communist KPD of the Third International. This is not something you can really blame Stalin for, but it created the conditions for what followed.
The ultraleft line of the Comintern in its third period led to disaster and betrayal in Germany in the 1930s. Stalin divided the forces working class by refusing to allow a united front of the communists with German Social Democracy.
What? These criticisms are all contradictory.
On the one hand, Stalin should’ve done more to spread the revolution to other countries, like Germany. On the other hand, he should’ve convinced the KPD to work together with the SDP instead of taking a more revolutionary approach. Were the SDP not the very people who were in the Second International and betrayed the revolution?
It seems kind of silly to blame the KPD-SDP split on Stalin considering that the social democrats both killed much of the KPD leadership (such as Rosa Luxembourg), and also continued using equivalent language about how the KPD were just as bad as the fascists. The SDP made the decision to align with the bourgeois parties and help them enact austerity policies during an economic crisis, and ultimately to back Hindenburg over Thälmann, who then appointed Hitler. The KPD felt that, in addition to the SDP being utterly uncooperative and uninterested in reconciliation, their association with crushing economic policy made them more of a liability than an asset - in hindsight, this was probably a miscalculation, but the blame is not entirely on them.
Now, if your position was that the USSR should have taken a realpolitik perspective and backed the anticommunist SDP to stop Hitler, despite their attitude to the KPD, that would be a coherent criticism - except that you also criticize the USSR for making a very similar decision in China. The USSR policy viewed the CCP as too weak to win a revolution, and instead aimed to achieve a united front, regardless of ideological disagreements.
Of course, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that this estimation was an error, but I’m asking for a single coherent path. Either be willing to compromise and work together with anti-communists like the KMT and the SDP, or take a hard line and support revolution - even in the face looming threats from the Nazis in one case and the Japanese on the other. Or, I suppose, take it on a case-by-case basis, in which case your criticism would be less ideological and more personal, regarding Stalin’s ability to assess foreign situations - and that’s a bit of stretch because I don’t think most of the leftists in Germany and China foresaw what would happen in their respective countries either.
Aside from these contradictions, I don’t really agree with the Trotskyist demand for an aggressive foreign policy. Of course, Marx predicted a global revolution but Marx was not a prophet, and socialist movements in other countries were not sufficiently developed to follow suit (as evidenced by the failure of the Second International). Trying to create an insurgency within another country is an act of aggression, at least potentially of war, and it seems like you’re demanding that the USSR should’ve gone to war with every country on earth simultaneously to compensate for the failure of those countries’ own socialist movements. That would’ve obviously been suicidal.
The USSR’s (post-Stalin) policy of “peaceful coexistence” was based on the correct understanding that such aggression would (perhaps correctly) be seen as a nationalistic act of aggression. Indeed, to the extent that the USSR expanded militarily, for example under Stalin or in Afghanistan, I think it deserves criticism. It seems a lot more reasonable to consolidate their position and serve as a proof of concept for socialists worldwide to follow on their own initiative than to try to impose those conflicts from the outside.
It is wrong to lump the KMT and the SPD together. The KMT was a bourgeois nationalist party. The SPD, despite its well documented problems, was a workers party with enormous political significance. Absolutely not tbe same, hence the difference in policy toward the two.
I don’t agree with that assessment. The KMT at the time was led by Sun Yat-Sen, who was much more left-leaning than his successor Chiang Kai-Shek. The KMT was originally a revolutionary party that deposed the monarchy, and it had left-wing elements within the party (as well as cooperating with the CCP) before Chiang purged them. Also worth noting that as a pre-industrial, colonized society, the class distinctions were not precisely the same as in Western countries, as demonstrated by the fact that it was by mobilizing the peasants rather than the much smaller industrial proletariat that the Chinese revolution was eventually successful. As argued by Franz Fanon, class collaboration with the bourgeoisie in poor countries is potentially viable because the primary conflict in those cases is with foreign colonizers.
If you ask me to choose between the early KMT under Sun that overthrew a monarchy and cooperated with communists, and the SDP who betrayed and murdered communists, denounced them as being as bad as fascists, and enacted austerity policies that contributed to the Nazis’ rise, I’m picking the early KMT every time.
It’s not “hostility to the working class,” it’s just objective facts. The CCP originally tried to follow the more orthodox approach of focusing on the industrial proletariat, with the exception of a particular member who had personal experience with the rural peasants and believed they had greater potential for radicalization. The CCP ignored him, and were promptly defeated, leading to the Long March. Among the survivors was that man I mentioned earlier, who was now able to implement his strategy of focusing on the peasants, and as a result of that strategy, even though the communists had been thoroughly defeated, hiding in the most remote regions of China, most of the party dead, the revolution caught on and spread like wildfire.
And in Germany, the so-called “working class” party of the SDP actively fought against the potential of setting up a socialist government, set the freicorps against communists, and insisted on setting up a system where they would give the bourgeoisie power and then work with them to worsen the conditions of the working class. You yourself acknowledged their betrayal of the working class, it’s just when they take off their “Second International” hat and put on their “SDP” hat they’re absolved of everything, apparently.
Goes to show that the Trotskyist tendency towards blind contrarianism is as strong as ever. If Trotsky and Stalin had switched roles, you’d all be Stalinists, it doesn’t even matter what their ideological differences were, you just want to support the guy who lost so that you can imagine he would’ve done everything perfectly and you don’t have to engage with difficult practical decisions. Classic “support every revolution, except the ones that succeed.”
I have to wonder how much of it is driven by chauvinism towards developing countries too, as you seem actively hostile to considering their material conditions.
What? These criticisms are all contradictory.
On the one hand, Stalin should’ve done more to spread the revolution to other countries, like Germany. On the other hand, he should’ve convinced the KPD to work together with the SDP instead of taking a more revolutionary approach. Were the SDP not the very people who were in the Second International and betrayed the revolution?
It seems kind of silly to blame the KPD-SDP split on Stalin considering that the social democrats both killed much of the KPD leadership (such as Rosa Luxembourg), and also continued using equivalent language about how the KPD were just as bad as the fascists. The SDP made the decision to align with the bourgeois parties and help them enact austerity policies during an economic crisis, and ultimately to back Hindenburg over Thälmann, who then appointed Hitler. The KPD felt that, in addition to the SDP being utterly uncooperative and uninterested in reconciliation, their association with crushing economic policy made them more of a liability than an asset - in hindsight, this was probably a miscalculation, but the blame is not entirely on them.
Now, if your position was that the USSR should have taken a realpolitik perspective and backed the anticommunist SDP to stop Hitler, despite their attitude to the KPD, that would be a coherent criticism - except that you also criticize the USSR for making a very similar decision in China. The USSR policy viewed the CCP as too weak to win a revolution, and instead aimed to achieve a united front, regardless of ideological disagreements.
Of course, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that this estimation was an error, but I’m asking for a single coherent path. Either be willing to compromise and work together with anti-communists like the KMT and the SDP, or take a hard line and support revolution - even in the face looming threats from the Nazis in one case and the Japanese on the other. Or, I suppose, take it on a case-by-case basis, in which case your criticism would be less ideological and more personal, regarding Stalin’s ability to assess foreign situations - and that’s a bit of stretch because I don’t think most of the leftists in Germany and China foresaw what would happen in their respective countries either.
Aside from these contradictions, I don’t really agree with the Trotskyist demand for an aggressive foreign policy. Of course, Marx predicted a global revolution but Marx was not a prophet, and socialist movements in other countries were not sufficiently developed to follow suit (as evidenced by the failure of the Second International). Trying to create an insurgency within another country is an act of aggression, at least potentially of war, and it seems like you’re demanding that the USSR should’ve gone to war with every country on earth simultaneously to compensate for the failure of those countries’ own socialist movements. That would’ve obviously been suicidal.
The USSR’s (post-Stalin) policy of “peaceful coexistence” was based on the correct understanding that such aggression would (perhaps correctly) be seen as a nationalistic act of aggression. Indeed, to the extent that the USSR expanded militarily, for example under Stalin or in Afghanistan, I think it deserves criticism. It seems a lot more reasonable to consolidate their position and serve as a proof of concept for socialists worldwide to follow on their own initiative than to try to impose those conflicts from the outside.
It is wrong to lump the KMT and the SPD together. The KMT was a bourgeois nationalist party. The SPD, despite its well documented problems, was a workers party with enormous political significance. Absolutely not tbe same, hence the difference in policy toward the two.
I don’t agree with that assessment. The KMT at the time was led by Sun Yat-Sen, who was much more left-leaning than his successor Chiang Kai-Shek. The KMT was originally a revolutionary party that deposed the monarchy, and it had left-wing elements within the party (as well as cooperating with the CCP) before Chiang purged them. Also worth noting that as a pre-industrial, colonized society, the class distinctions were not precisely the same as in Western countries, as demonstrated by the fact that it was by mobilizing the peasants rather than the much smaller industrial proletariat that the Chinese revolution was eventually successful. As argued by Franz Fanon, class collaboration with the bourgeoisie in poor countries is potentially viable because the primary conflict in those cases is with foreign colonizers.
If you ask me to choose between the early KMT under Sun that overthrew a monarchy and cooperated with communists, and the SDP who betrayed and murdered communists, denounced them as being as bad as fascists, and enacted austerity policies that contributed to the Nazis’ rise, I’m picking the early KMT every time.
Alright. Goes to show the Stalinist hostility to the revolutionary working class and their affinity for bourgeois nationalism is as strong as ever.
It’s not “hostility to the working class,” it’s just objective facts. The CCP originally tried to follow the more orthodox approach of focusing on the industrial proletariat, with the exception of a particular member who had personal experience with the rural peasants and believed they had greater potential for radicalization. The CCP ignored him, and were promptly defeated, leading to the Long March. Among the survivors was that man I mentioned earlier, who was now able to implement his strategy of focusing on the peasants, and as a result of that strategy, even though the communists had been thoroughly defeated, hiding in the most remote regions of China, most of the party dead, the revolution caught on and spread like wildfire.
And in Germany, the so-called “working class” party of the SDP actively fought against the potential of setting up a socialist government, set the freicorps against communists, and insisted on setting up a system where they would give the bourgeoisie power and then work with them to worsen the conditions of the working class. You yourself acknowledged their betrayal of the working class, it’s just when they take off their “Second International” hat and put on their “SDP” hat they’re absolved of everything, apparently.
Goes to show that the Trotskyist tendency towards blind contrarianism is as strong as ever. If Trotsky and Stalin had switched roles, you’d all be Stalinists, it doesn’t even matter what their ideological differences were, you just want to support the guy who lost so that you can imagine he would’ve done everything perfectly and you don’t have to engage with difficult practical decisions. Classic “support every revolution, except the ones that succeed.”
I have to wonder how much of it is driven by chauvinism towards developing countries too, as you seem actively hostile to considering their material conditions.