The tragedy can often be avoided by everyone agreeing that destroying the commons is bad
Right, but you’re also creating a prisoner’s dilemma. That is, if everyone agrees to work one way, and you have one person that breaks rules in a way that gets them ahead–and lets say that, in a purely communist society, that ‘getting ahead’ in this instance means that they need to put in less work to have the same result as everyone else, and thus have more time available for themselves–then it creates a strong incentive for everyone to follow suit. You need those outside regulatory bodies with enforcement powers in order to create the disincentive to breaking rules and agreements.
Perversely, farmers often know that what they’re doing is deeply harmful for the environment, but there are strong financial disincentives preventing them from changing. Without both a regulatory structure forcing change on everyone, combined with incentives that make changing affordable to them (such as giving them cash to buy updated equipment to farm in new ways, and ensuring revenue levels), they’re kinda fucked.
Yes, that’s the original game theory view that was popular during the 60s. The other two links reference modern day studies which show it doesn’t hold up to reality. People naturally choose cooperation and have no problem avoiding the worst outcome. They understand the tragedy and will work together to regulate themselves in order to avoid it.
I already wrote it in the edit of my first comment: you don’t need a centralized control force once everyone monitors everyone else. When one is cheating (what ever that means), people will notice and bring it up on the council meeting or what ever. Punishment for small transgressions will be small so you doesn’t feel like a snitch or something. Listen to the linked episode in my first comment, the Wrong Boys are fun to listen to!
If there is a council meeting doling out punishments for transgressions, then it seems like this is just one of the normal solutions for the tragedy of the commons. It doesn’t seem like a refutation of the concept of the tragedy, or an example of a community respecting the commons without incentives.
Council not in the sense that it’s a central committee but a meeting open for every member. And that’s how commons are commonly organized. Community organized by themselves with rules everyone agreed on.
Commons are common all over the world. It’s not a concept of some armchair socialists. It was the armchair guy who came up with the tragedy of the commons and went on to privatize existing and working commons. Empirical scientists went on the study existing commons. The question isn’t can they work, we know empirically they do.
Right, but you’re also creating a prisoner’s dilemma. That is, if everyone agrees to work one way, and you have one person that breaks rules in a way that gets them ahead–and lets say that, in a purely communist society, that ‘getting ahead’ in this instance means that they need to put in less work to have the same result as everyone else, and thus have more time available for themselves–then it creates a strong incentive for everyone to follow suit. You need those outside regulatory bodies with enforcement powers in order to create the disincentive to breaking rules and agreements.
Perversely, farmers often know that what they’re doing is deeply harmful for the environment, but there are strong financial disincentives preventing them from changing. Without both a regulatory structure forcing change on everyone, combined with incentives that make changing affordable to them (such as giving them cash to buy updated equipment to farm in new ways, and ensuring revenue levels), they’re kinda fucked.
Yes, that’s the original game theory view that was popular during the 60s. The other two links reference modern day studies which show it doesn’t hold up to reality. People naturally choose cooperation and have no problem avoiding the worst outcome. They understand the tragedy and will work together to regulate themselves in order to avoid it.
I already wrote it in the edit of my first comment: you don’t need a centralized control force once everyone monitors everyone else. When one is cheating (what ever that means), people will notice and bring it up on the council meeting or what ever. Punishment for small transgressions will be small so you doesn’t feel like a snitch or something. Listen to the linked episode in my first comment, the Wrong Boys are fun to listen to!
If there is a council meeting doling out punishments for transgressions, then it seems like this is just one of the normal solutions for the tragedy of the commons. It doesn’t seem like a refutation of the concept of the tragedy, or an example of a community respecting the commons without incentives.
Council not in the sense that it’s a central committee but a meeting open for every member. And that’s how commons are commonly organized. Community organized by themselves with rules everyone agreed on.
Commons are common all over the world. It’s not a concept of some armchair socialists. It was the armchair guy who came up with the tragedy of the commons and went on to privatize existing and working commons. Empirical scientists went on the study existing commons. The question isn’t can they work, we know empirically they do.
The affor mentioned podcast episode is very informative. Andrewism also has a video about that topic.